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ABSTRACT
In IPv6 networks, two security mechanisms are available at
the network-layer; SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) and
IP security (IPsec). Although both provide authentication,
neither subsumes the other; both SEND and IPsec mech-
anisms should be deployed together to protect IPv6 net-
works. However, when a node uses both SEND and IPsec,
the authentication has to be done twice, which increases
the burden on the node and decreases its performance. In
this paper, we propose an approach to enable them to work
together under the mediation of an Authentication Manage-
ment Block, where IPsec uses the public-private keys ob-
tained by SEND rather than negotiating its own authenti-
cation credentials in order to save the time and facilitate
the IPsec authentication deployment. We implement and
evaluate our approach using ipsec-tools and DoCoMo SEND
implementations. Our proof-of-concept experiment shows a
considerable speedup of IPsec authentication time.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—au-
thentication
Keywords
IPv6 security, Authentication mechanism, IKEv2, CGA
General Terms
Experimentation, Performance
1. INTRODUCTION
IP security (IPsec) is a suite of protocols that secure data
communication at network-layer [12]. It provides packet-
level authentication, data integrity, and data confidentiality.
According to RFC 6434, IPsec should be supported by all
IPv6 nodes [8]. However, IPsec is not appropriate for secur-
ing IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) [16], [17]. A
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chicken-and-egg problem [2] appears when trying to use In-
ternet Key Exchange (IKE) [9] for NDP operations. Using
automatic IKE requires that the nodes have addresses be-
fore. On the other hand, IPv6 nodes use NDP to configure
their addresses automatically at the initial stage when they
join a new subnet. Therefore, the security must be consid-
ered at the initial stage when the host gets its address. As a
result, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) decided
to abandon IPsec for securing NDP and design the SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [3] which is an integral part to
the NDP. However, SEND is a local link security approach
and cannot protect the connections outside its scope.
Accordingly, in IPv6 environment both SEND and IPsec
should be used together for protecting network-layer. SEND
complements the weakness of NDP within the local network
at the initial stage and IPsec is used to protect IP packets
for Internet communication. Therefore, hosts are first au-
thenticated with SEND and are then authenticated again
with IPsec. The repeated authentications increase the bur-
den on the host and decreases its performance, in particular
on resource-constrained devices, such as mobile phones.
Our aim is to avoid this repeated authentication step in IPv6
environments by sharing the authentication information be-
tween SEND and IPsec. The shared authentication informa-
tion is stored in authentication database. The Cryptograph-
ically Generated Address (CGA) [5] of the host, whose au-
thentication is completed by SEND, is stored in this shared
authentication database. IPsec checks the shared authen-
tication database before it carries out the authentication
step. If the authenticated credentials (public-private keys)
obtained by SEND are stored in the shared database, IPsec
does not negotiate its own authentication information.
Using CGA for IPsec authentication reduces the hurdles of
IPsec authentication configuration mainly in the absence of
a global trust authority. CGA is a standalone authentication
which does not need a third party where the control remain
at endpoint owner. Every node can generate it own public
private key pairs. This approach automates the authenti-
cation process. So, no need for pre-deployed information
that have been authenticated by trusted authorities that
cause significant time and effort to setup security associa-
tions. Moreover, this approach is consistent with RFC3723
which forbids manual keying [1].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides the basic background about IPsec and SEND. Sec-
tion 3 describes key related works. Section 4 describes our
proposed scheme. Section 5 evaluates the performance and
the security implication of our approach. We conclude our
work in Section 6.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce IPsec suite with the focus the
authentication part of establishing security associations in
Internet Key Exchange (IKE). This is followed with a brief
description of SEND.
2.1 IPsec/IKEv2
The Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) [9] is the protocol re-
sponsible for the establishment of IPsec security associations
(SAs), achieving the mutual authentication and selecting
cryptographic keys. It does an automatic configuration for
the security protocols (Authentication Header (AH) [10] or
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [11]), manages the
entries in the Security Association Database (SAD) and en-
sures the mutual authentication of the hosts while initializ-
ing the IPsec connection.
IKEv2 performs mutual authentication between initiator and
responder by establishing security associations (SAs) in two
phases. Phase 1 establishes SA that carries IKE messages
between the peers. Phase 2 establishes other SAs to carry
the protected IPsec traffic. The SAs that carries IKEv2
messages is denoted as IKE SA, and the SAs for IPsec is
denoted as CHILD SA. All communications comprise pairs
of a request and response messages (IKEv2 exchange). In
IKEv2, Phase 1 has two steps. Step 1 (IKE SA INIT) ne-
gotiates security parameters to create IKE SA, computes
secret keys for IKE, and computes master secret for comput-
ing IPsec keys in Phase 2. The initiator sends its supported
Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the nonce value to the re-
sponder in IKE SA INIT request. The responder includes
its acceptable cryptographic algorithm, its own part of the
Diffie-Hellman key and nonce and returns it back to the
initiator in IKE SA INIT response. The attributes of the
IKE SA can be exchanged during IKE SA INIT exchange,
i.e., the message authentication algorithm, and encryption
algorithm, and Diffie-Helman group information. After com-
pleting the IKE SA INIT exchange successfully, both peers
can independently calculate the keying information that is
used to authenticate the IKE peers, to authenticate and en-
crypt messages, and to derive keys that are established for
child SAs.
Phase 1, step 2 (IKE AUTH) completes activation of IKE
SA and sets up an SA for Phase 2 (first child SA). The initia-
tor sends an IKE AUTH request that includes its identity
and authentication information. The authentication infor-
mation depends on the initiator’s authentication mechanism
that was defined in IKE SA INIT exchange. The most com-
mon IKE authentication methods are the pre-shared-key
(PSK) and certificate-based (X.509 certificate). For PSK
authentication, the communicating peer proves its identity
through the knowledge of the PSK and with giving a cor-
rectly encrypted response. For certificate-based authentica-
tion, the initiator includes the certificate it used to create
its signature in IKE AUTH request. In the IKE AUTH re-
sponse, the responder includes its certificate which has to be
signed by the responders trusted authority and prove that
node has the private key which corresponds to the public
key in the certificate. Besides that, the initiators send a list
of their trust anchors. The responders send their signed cer-
tificate and a proof for the ownership of the private key for
the certificate to prove their identities.
Phase 2 (CREATE CHILD SA) setups AH or ESP secu-
rity associations (SAs). For IKEv2, the initiator sends a
CREATE CHILD SA request that contains some proposals
for parameters, such as session key. The responder answers
with a CREATE CHILD SA response that contains the ac-
ceptable parameters. These parameters are stored in the
SAD and will be used for ensuring confidentiality and in-
tegrity of the messages which are protected by IPsec. The
attributes that can be negotiated in this phase include the
protocol (AH or ESP), the authentication algorithm, encap-
sulation mode (tunnel or transport), encryption algorithm
and Diffie-Helman group information.
However, IPsec is not applicable for securing NDP and the
local link communications [4]. IPsec uses IKE that requires a
valid IPv6 address, while this cannot be done during the ini-
tial phase of IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration. There-
fore, the SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) has been de-
signed as an extension to NDP to offer the authentication
at the initial stage for generating a secure IPv6 address.
2.2 SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)
SEND has been developed to secure Neighbor Discovery
Protocol (NDP). SEND is a set of enhancements to the
NDP messages which mainly depends on Cryptographically
Generated Addresses (CGA) [5] and X.509 certificates [15].
SEND participates in authentication at the initial stage for
generating a secure IPv6 address. CGA for IPv6 enables
the nodes to generate their own secure address and verify
the ones from others without relying on any global trust au-
thority, i.e., the node’s capability to prove it has the address
it claims to have. In CGA, the interface identifier of IPv6
address is created from truncated SHA-1 hash of the address
owner’s public key and other auxiliary parameters. The
node sends its CGA parameters and a signed message from
the CGA. The receiver recomputed the hash of the sender
CGA parameters according to CGA standard [5], compares
it with interface identifier of the source address, and ver-
ify the signature using the Public Key. Thus, the receiver
knows that this address is bonded to this public key.
Therefore, each SEND and IPsec perform a separate authen-
tication for the same node in IPv6 environments. The dupli-
cated authentication on the same host increases the process-
ing cost and consumes the computing device energy. There-
fore, the duplicate authentication might be redundant by
sharing the authentication information between SEND and
IPsec. Several approaches have been proposed to achieve
this goal as we show in the following section.
3. RELATED WORK
The most related approach to ours has been presented by
Kim et al. [13], where they propose a cooperation authen-
tication of IPsec and SEND. Our approach is in fact an
enhanced version of their approach because their approach
has some limitations; They store only CGAs in a reposi-
tory and IPsec skips the authentication for the existing IP
address in this repository. Skipping the authentication ne-
gotiation in IPsec makes it vulnerable to man in the middle
attacks. Also, the collaboration between SEND and IPsec,
in their approach, is not always feasible for all network en-
vironments. The collaboration system assumes that both
SEND and IPsec are running simultaneously on particular
nodes located at the same subnet in order to benefit from
the SEND authentication information and skip the IPsec au-
thentication procedure. The reason is that the host authen-
tication information cannot be shared with the other host
in a different network because the SEND operates inside the
local network only. Moreover, they used asynchronous com-
munication for the interaction between IPsec and SEND.
This makes it necessary for the IPsec to wait for one second
after each request to make sure that the repository process
had enough time to handle the request and answer accord-
ingly. Because of this necessary waiting, the processing time
for the authentication step of the IKE protocol is always at
least one second, which is considerably longer than the time
needed for the regular authentication step.
There are other several approaches whose goal is to inte-
grate CGA and IKE. For instance, Castelluccia et al. pro-
pose an opportunistic encryption scheme based on crypto-
graphic identifier (Crypto-Based Identifiers) for establishing
IPsec tunnels between specific security gateways [6]. An
IETF draft [14] follows this work and proposes using IKE
with IPv6 CGA. However, this draft expired on January 9,
2008. Combes et al. follow the design choice of this IETF
draft [14] to use CGA as alternative security credentials with
IKEv2 [7]. They included the CGA parameters in the IKEv2
payload and consider it as a new certificate type.
4. SEND AND IPSEC COMBINED AUTHEN-
TICATION METHOD
The idea of our approach is to use the CGA as an authen-
tication mechanism for IPsec. The CGAs of all communi-
cation nodes which are authenticated by SEND represent
the mutual authentication information between SEND and
IPsec. If a host uses CGA authentication, then IKE AUTH
exchange in IKE of IPsec can use CGA public key. This
combined authentication approach uses a shared database
between SEND and IPsec for exchanging the authentication
information.
Fig. 1 shows the general architecture of this approach and
the interaction between the different components. The main
components are the SEND Block, the IPsec Block, and the
Authentication Management Block. The SEND Block stands
for the SEND implementation whereas the IPsec Block rep-
resents the IPsec protocol implementation. The Authenti-
cation Management Block manages the interaction between
SEND Block and IPsec Block.
The SEND Block does the CGA generation (IP address au-
thentication), handles the packets related to ND messages,
and adds the authenticated CGAs and parameters to the IP
Database. The SEND Block verifies the source CGA of an
arriving SEND packet and adds the validated address to the
database if it is not already stored there.
The IPsec Block secures the other IP packets rather than ND
Figure 1: General architecture for SEND and IPsec
collaboration.
packets. IPsec Block sends a check signal to the Database
Management Module to check if the source IP address can be
found in the IP Database. If yes, IPsec Block skips the nor-
mal authentication during IKE AUTH of the IKE key ex-
change and uses the CGA public keys. The IPsec Block pro-
cesses all IPsec packets and verifies if the connection partner
can be authenticated via its IP by iterating over the stored
IP addresses to determine if the provided IP address has
been authenticated by SEND Block.
The Authentication Management Block carries out the func-
tion of SEND and IPsec packets analysis and authentication
management. Once a CGA is successfully generated, the
Authentication Management Block stores the authentication
information in the IP Database. This database contains the
CGAs and parameters of the nodes whose authentication is
completed by SEND. The Authentication Management Block
answers the check signal of IPsec Block whether the address
already exists or not.
The communication between SEND Block and IPsec Block
is implemented in a way such that both blocks use the pro-
vided interface to access the database. Fig. 2 and 3 show a
typical interaction of those blocks with the Authentication
Management Block.
To achieve the combination between SEND and IPsec, we
modified IKEv2 payload to use SEND keys. However, our
modifications do not change the existing IPsec architecture.
In IKEv2, the Identification (ID) payload contains the peer’s
identity to be authenticated with the authentication (AUTH)
payload. CGA is set within the ID payload under the IKEv2
identity type ID IPV6 ADDR. The certificate payload (CERT)
provides a means to transport certificates or other authenti-
cation related information via IKE. In case of using SEND
credentials for IPsec, the CERT payload is used to transmit
the CGA parameters. The Certificate Request (CERTREQ)
payload determines what certificates the initiator is willing
to use. For CGA, we need new type of CERTREQ payload.
The Authentication payload (AUTH) contains data used for
authentication purposes. For CGA, it contains a digital sig-
Figure 2: Sequence diagram of for handling the re-
ceived ND message in a combined SEND and IPsec
authentication.
Figure 3: Sequence diagram for handling the re-
ceived IPsec packet in a combined SEND and IPsec
authentication.
nature of the message computed using the corresponding
public key in CGA parameters.
5. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
In this section, we present the evaluation of our approach
with respect to the deployment considerations, performance
and security implications.
In order to implement the collaboration between SEND and
IPsec, we adapt both the SEND and the IPsec implementa-
tions accordingly. We use the open source DoCoMo SEND1
and ipsec-tools2 software to test the necessary extension of
the collaboration module between SEND and IPsec. In Do-
CoMo SEND, we adapt the method of handling the incoming
ND messages by changing the method handle incoming() in
the file proto.c. This change adds the respective code nec-
essary to add the verified CGA to the IP Database. For
ipsec-tools, we add the communication code, which is nec-
1http://www.aestheticscientist.com/082406/lab opensource.html
2http://ipsec-tools.sourceforge.net
essary to check if the received CGA is already stored in the
IP Database. We also do the modification code responsi-
ble for skipping the original authentication if possible to the
method oakley validate auth() in the IPsec daemon racoon
source file oakley.c.
The communication between the three described blocks is
done in a synchronous way. This synchronous communica-
tion enables the IPsec Block to directly decide if the CGA
authentication can be used, without waiting for a reply from
another process. Our implementation keeps the IP Database
duplicate-free, due to the insert mechanism used.
5.1 Performance Evaluation
During our experiments, we use a testbed which consists
of two machines and one router, which are all located in
the same subnet. Whereas the router advertises the prefix
used for global IP addresses, the other two host machines
use the respective implementations to create an encrypted
IPsec connection between hosts, according to our modified
approach. All three machines in this scenario runn FreeBSD
9.03 as operating system, DoCoMo SEND4 version 0.3 and
ipsec-tools version 0.8.0.
Table 1 shows the measurement results of the authentication
time of the regular IPsec/IKEv2 implementation and our
modified implementation. The measurements are taken for
two authentication methods: the pre-shared key authenti-
cation (PSK) and the certificate-based authentication using
X.509 certificates. The measurement results are shown in
milliseconds (ms). Our implementation performs 1.5 to 1.7
times faster than the regular IPsec/IKEv2 authentication.
Table 1: IPsec authentication time measurement re-
sults in milliseconds (ms).
Implementation Authentication Methods
CGA IKEv2 0.80 (CGA) 0.28 (CGA)
Regular IKEv2 1.38 (X.509) 0.43 (PSK)
5.2 Security Implications
We believe that using CGA for authentication of IPsec does
not lead to any recognizable security threats. If a malicious
node spoofs a valid CGA and tries to use it for commu-
nicating with other nodes, it will not succeed, because the
malicious node needs to sign the outgoing packets with the
private key corresponding to spoofed address. On the other
side, the receiver node will verify the CGA and the signa-
ture and discards the packet if the verification fails. More-
over, the spoofing attack is not possible if IPsec uses the
pre-shared-key authentication, because the malicious node
is unable to decrypt the initial packets where the session
key is created. Since CGA does not depend on any trust
authority, a malicious node can generate its own CGA and
start communicating with other nodes. Proof of the author-
ity is out of the scope of CGA. At least using CGA prevents
the theft of other nodes’ addresses. Therefore, we do not
consider it a drawback of CGA or our proposal. On the
contrary it can be an advantage of our approach, because
3http://www.freebsd.org/where.html
4http://people.freebsd.org/∼ehaupt/distilator/net-
mgmt/send/
the entire communication process is secured for all steps.
CGA is used to generate a secure IPv6 address at the initial
stage and this secure address is used for establishing secure
IPsec connection.
5.3 Deployment Considerations
In practice, there are three different scenarios where SEND
and IPsec can be used simultaneously: When the communi-
cating hosts are on the same subnet, when the hosts com-
municate with each other through a security gateway, and
when the communicating hosts belong to different networks.
Our approach can be used for all these scenarios. If SEND
authentication is successful, a CGA assigned to the host
can be stored in the authentication database with its cor-
responding CGA parameters. Then, IPsec Block can check
IP Database and use these authentication information for
its own authentication.
In IPv6 networks, the IP address can be frequently changed
in order to protect the user’s privacy or to achieve the move-
ment of the host. The changeable addresses may affect the
IPsec connection. If one host changes its address, the estab-
lished IPsec connection will fail. Accordingly, the collabo-
ration system should be able to maintain IPsec connection
for changeable addresses. There are two possible solutions
for this problem. First, when a host changes its address, it
sends the existing session information and security key infor-
mation concerning the newly assigned address to the other
host. Since the node that changed its IP address is the only
one that could know the common secret it could prove its
identity by this. Therefore, there is a need to create a mech-
anism where a new connection could be established with an
already existing common secret which has to be saved and
which could be associated with a previous interaction. Sec-
ond solution is to continue using the existing IP address for
the already established connections for which it is not possi-
ble to use the new address without interrupting the current
application. However, the old address should be treated as
a deprecated address and should not be used for new con-
nections and should be deleted once the already established
connections are finished. Using the deprecated address does
not require sending any secrets or re-authenticating because
the connection is not aborted and the other side is still able
to communicate to the former address. Therefore, we recom-
mend the use of the second approach because there is lower
management cost and the risk of interrupting the running
applications is also lower.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a collaboration authentication method
between SEND and IPsec in an IPv6 environment. The col-
laboration system includes three main blocks; SEND Block,
IPsec Block, and Database Authentication Block. The SEND
Block authenticates the hosts’ address and stores the au-
thentication information corresponding to the hosts in the
IP database. The IPsec Block checks whether the IP address
is present in the IP Database or not. If the authentication
information is valid, IPsec can use these authentication cre-
dentials inside of exchange its own. The IP Database can
be updated when the host generates a new address. The
new address should be used for all connections when it pos-
sible. The evaluation results show a significant performance
advantage of using this approach compared to the conven-
tional system where SEND and IPsec deployed separately.
We additionally discuss the feasibility of using this system
in different network environments and discuss the security
implications involved.
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